US COIN Doctrine and Practice: An Ally's Perspective

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Until very recently, the four and a half years of military operations in Iraq appeared to have created an obstacle in people's minds. Rightly or wrongly, reality has subsumed theory, and because of the media coverage Iraq has received, counterinsurgency is now seen as nothing but an indescribably bloody, draining, protracted, and arduous business which makes tremendous demands on popular support, political resolve, and the resources required to sustain the fight. History shows this has always been the case, but perhaps the initial incidences of rapid, decisive, conventional operations misled the public. The fact remains: The cost of counterinsurgency is high. It always has been, depressingly so, and it is largely unrefundable. There is now more than a glimmer of hope, a detectable, increasingly palpable feeling that something may be changing, that there is now what can be best described as "a reasonable degree of tactical momentum on the ground."[1]

Leadership, more troops, focused training during preparation for deployment, and the application of hard-learned lessons from four and a half years at war are playing their part. A new factor is present, one that is fundamental to overcoming many of the initial obstacles and a factor that was absent when the insurgencies started to emerge from the shadows to so bedevil the stabilization efforts in Iraq. That factor is doctrine, and the publication of US Army Field Manual 3-24 and US Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 provides American participants with a counterinsurgency doctrine applicable, as the authors intended, to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and for similar operations well into the second decade of this century.

The development of FM 3-24 is notable for at least two reasons.[2] First, the writing team canvassed and included a far wider range of opinion and expertise than is normally the case in developing such documents, giving

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the doctrine a wider applicability than simply how to win in Iraq. Second, and arguably of greater importance, the speed with which both the doctrine was produced, incorporating that wider view, and at the same time the entire education and training systems were revamped was unprecedented. The project underlines the fact that there is much more to the development and implementation of doctrine than the publication of a pamphlet. Outcomes depend on the approach that the doctrine describes being taught, understood, and executed. To be effective, doctrine must be assimilated, absorbed into the military culture, and then sensibly applied to the prevailing conditions.

This article offers an assessment on the development of US counterinsurgency doctrine and one view of how it has been applied to operations in the field. The hypothesis is that FM 3-24 conveys an effective military doctrine. Although its utility to the soldier and marine is evident from the reports emanating from Iraq, it is equally clear that FM 3-24 is not the final answer. What David Galula identifies as the 80 percent political action formula is beyond the scope of FM 3-24, but it still needs to be addressed.[3] The article provides a brief but necessary reminder of doctrine's function and identifies six criteria for evaluating doctrine to be utilized in examining FM 3-24, testing its theoretical effectiveness. It then offers commentary on counterinsurgency practice in Iraq in the light of the new doctrine before returning to Galula's missing 80 percent. The hypothesis is supported by interviews with authors of the doctrine, service members serving and others who have served in Iraq, post-operational reports, and the ever-growing body of literature. Some careful consideration has also been given to opinion pieces and editorials published in various media.

Writing COIN Doctrine

Writing counterinsurgency doctrine today faces two major hurdles. First, things have changed markedly since the problem was last considered. John Mackinlay, David Kilcullen, and Steven Metz are three contemporary authors who have pointed out that warning signs related to this change have existed for some time.[4] There is little doubt that we are at a historic turning point in the evolution of counterinsurgency doctrine, doctrine which is reasonably well-known and better understood. The tools that governments have available today are quite different from those available for El Salvador,

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Vietnam, Algeria, Northern Ireland, or Malaya. Interdepartmental and international cooperation, a key feature of past campaigns, is rusty and the organizational understanding between governments is once again a work in progress. Second, and as a result of the first hurdle, counterinsurgent forces face the same challenges as their predecessors in coming up with answers to post-Maoist insurgencies: One part of a complex, multifaceted solution cannot be expected to come up with the complete answer in one simple move. It would be completely unrealistic then for anyone to expect that the Army could. History demonstrates that solutions to such challenges evolve from an incremental process that takes time and any number of iterations.

While insurgency remains a highly political form of warfare, its character, not its nature, has changed. FM 3-24 sees the insurgent-counterinsurgent struggle as a "complex subset of warfare,"[5] what Colin Gray terms "organized violence threatened or waged for political purposes."[6] As a form of warfare, deriving a Gray analogy, insurgency cannot change its nature any more than a cat can become a dog. But some cats are tigers, and this is the likely cause of the confusion regarding the nature and character of such conflict. The problem is infinitely more complex and is potentially much more dangerous than previously might have been the case. But this does not change the basic character of the threat: "An organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control."[7]

Today's challenge of complexity and ever-evolving threats do not change the insurgent's and the counterinsurgent's focus on the population whose support, consent, and tolerance remain critical to countering any insurgency. This means that the balance of effort in a counterinsurgency campaign is still, as David Galula pointed out, at least 80 percent political and 20 percent military.[8] The admonition from General Sir Frank Kitson, arguably the most influential British counterinsurgency theorist and practitioner, still rings true: "There can be no such thing as a purely military solution because insurgency is not primarily a military activity."[9] No matter how radical and complex an insurgency may be, and however the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan are interpreted, counterinsurgency is still not a military activity and current doctrine should reflect that fact.

Doctrine and Its Effectiveness

In 1926 Major General J. F. C. Fuller, the father of British military doctrine, identified three fundamentals of military doctrine when he stated: "The central idea of an army . . . to be sound must be based on the principles of war, and to be effective must be elastic enough to admit to mutation in accor-

dance with change in circumstance."[10] Doctrine provides the bridge from theory to practice, based on an understanding of experience. It informs practitioners how and what to think about a problem. How far it goes from "how to think" to "what to think" is largely determined by the education, training, and experience of the force for which it is written. The better the education and training and the greater the experience, the less resource needs to be expended on what to think. Whether it is how or what, provided the doctrine is updated to reflect change and the practitioner is capable of exercising judgement when applying doctrinal imperatives, all should be well. The difficulty comes when a doctrinal void arises. Since the solution to insurgencies is found in the circumstances, not the doctrine, if there is no doctrine, circumstances may rule unbounded.[11] The US Army regards itself as a doctrine-based institution.[12] As John Nagl describes, doctrine is:

> Enormously important to the United States Army; it codifies both how the institution thinks about its role in the world and how it accomplishes that role on the battlefield . . . . Doctrine drives decisions on how the Army should be organized . . . what missions it should train to accomplish . . . and what equipment it needs.[13]

For a doctrine-based army, the "doctrinal gap" in counterinsurgency must have been deeply troubling.[14] Michael Howard once said:

> I am tempted indeed to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the armed forces are working on now, that they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. What matters is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives.[15]

It took some time for the US Army's counterinsurgency "get it right" moment to arrive, and the catalyst was the publication of a comprehensive and adaptive doctrine. The question now is, "is what has been published effective?"

What makes doctrine effective? Some criteria are needed by which doctrine, of whatever sort, may be judged.[16] At the start of the British Army's counterinsurgency doctrine review, this author interviewed a significant portion of the brigade and divisional commanders with Iraq experience, senior staff officers who had worked in Baghdad, current battalion commanders, and instructors and students at the Staff College in an attempt to establish a mutual understanding of doctrine and what these officers and their soldiers required of it. The expectations these individuals had of doctrine were then cross-referenced against a more traditional view (from the past) of what doctrine should be. The principal criteria the review identified were:

- Doctrine should be written for and meet the needs of the practitioner.
- Doctrine should be acceptable to its primary audience.

● Doctrine should inform individuals how to think, not prescribe what to think.

      ● Doctrine must be teachable.

      ● Doctrine must be relevant and current.

      ● Doctrine must be manageable and accessible.

The Audience

Self-evidently, doctrine must be written for the practitioner. That is not to ignore the wider interest doctrine generates, the arguments it will impact, or the central role it plays in discussion, debate, and disagreement.[17] The doctrine writers have to recognize that doctrine will not be all things to all people; they need to focus their efforts on the principal audience. The ongoing responses to FM 3-24 prove that point. The fact that FM 3-24 was written to meet the needs of the soldier in the field and to provide guidance for commanders is clear. The focus of FM 3-24 is the tactical level of warfare, albeit spanning from corps to battalion in the context of a joint and combined campaign for which doctrinal guidance did not previously exist.[18] This takes the argument back to the "80 percent political, 20 percent military" concern. How can doctrine be developed without a clearly articulated joint and interagency approach? This is not a new problem; Kitson understood it and highlighted both the importance of interagency work and an understanding of the need to train for the joint, interagency environment:

> The . . . problem is more difficult because so many of the people who will be most influential in determining success or failure are not in the armed forces at all. They are the politicians, civil servants, local government officials and police, in the area where the insurgency is taking place, and, as I said earlier, that may be in someone else's country . . . . Service officers must be taught how to fit together a campaign of civil and operational measures; they must know what is needed in terms of intelligence, and the law, and of moulding public opinion.[19]

The writer of doctrine should make a sensible assessment of the ideal and balance it against reality. This balance reflects the dynamic between the writer and the soldier who has to apply the doctrine in any number of circumstances. Anyone can quote Galula and Kitson and trust that the 80 percent will be there when required. The reality, however, is that the soldier has to carry far more of the responsibility than he would wish, being in harm's way without the crucial support of civilian agencies that may choose to participate or not. The soldier on the ground has the responsibility of translating theory into practice even though some things may be lacking in the doctrinal approach identified. While FM 3-24 explains operational design and the integration of nonmilitary lines of operation into the campaign, an area of

weakness exists in terms of the absence of doctrine and policy capable of incorporating the full range of all the instruments of national power.

Audience Acceptance

Doctrine should be generally acceptable to its principal audience. Those who have to execute it should be able to recognize the value of what it says, balance it against their experience, and assimilate it. Principles and approaches need to make sense in theory and be translatable to sensible practices. There is an inevitable tension between personal experience and doctrine, particularly when doctrine is produced during the heat of battle. The challenge for the doctrinal writer is all the greater when a large proportion of his army is deeply involved in conflict and can legitimately offer the criticism, "that's not the war I saw."[20] This doctrinal conundrum can be ameliorated by education and training.

While some might have been unfamiliar with or skeptical of the clear-hold-build approach[21] and critical of its application in Iraq, it has clearly identifiable roots based, like all effective doctrine, on experience and sound analysis.[22] Those familiar with the proposals of Robert Thompson will recognize the concept of clear-hold-winning-won[23] and the methodology Galula presents in his outstanding, often bitterly realistic view of counterinsurgency.[24] Galula, like Thompson, identifies the essential task of securing and protecting the population, gaining its support, and then acquiring information to identify and locate insurgents in order to defeat the insurgency.

In terms of the wider audience, it is important to record the manner in which a broad base of consensus was developed by including a broad spectrum of views: government departments, anthropologists, human rights lawyers, aid workers, and allies. This was a factor General David Petraeus, who instigated the new US doctrine, recognized from the outset:

> A process like this, producing something as important as COIN doctrine, where so many seem to hold a view, needs engagement with a much wider group than standard doctrine has traditionally needed. You have to get as many as possible inside the tent.[25]

An important step in the development of the new doctrine was the review conference held at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in February 2006. General Petraeus moderated the open, inclusive, high-quality discussion and debate.[26] The result was broad engagement that provided the doctrine with meaningful substance and a greater sense of investment on the part of those who were involved. This fora of open discussions and interaction has not prevented an equally wide-range of criticism, but it is abundantly clear that irre-

spective of these negative comments, there was unanimity in the belief that change was needed.

Is it Teachable?

Doctrine must be teachable, easily translated into material which informs discussion and debate, shapes the argument, and creates an intellectual framework that the military student can examine and analyze in an effort to formulate a concept and then a solution. Get this process wrong and the situation can be difficult to recover. This was the case when the British Army introduced the "Estimate" into its decisionmaking process. As a result of poorly expressed, overly complicated ideas, there is now a generation of officers scarred by the experience of having to learn a simple process that was made impossibly difficult by the measures implemented by the Army.

The importance of education in supporting counterinsurgency doctrine cannot be overemphasized. General Kitson understood this point and influenced several campaigns, generations of Staff College graduates, and military commanders through his work.[27] Kitson devoted a whole chapter in his seminal book *Low Intensity Operations* to education and training, identifying four imperatives that are as valid today as when he wrote them:

● The importance of attuning "men's minds to cope with the environment of this sort of war."

● The importance of officers being "taught how to put a campaign together using a combination of civil and military measures to achieve a single government aim . . . teaching them the value of nonmilitary ways of harming the enemy."

● The importance of teaching "officers how to direct the activities of their own soldiers . . . policemen . . . or locally raised forces . . . [in] the right sort of tactical framework in which to use the techniques to best advantage."

● The importance of the methods used to teach the techniques themselves, "selecting the right lessons to stress . . . [and] setting the training in such a way that it makes sense in the context of proper handling of information . . . within a realistic and instructive framework."[28]

Without addressing these imperatives, the likelihood of doctrine being assimilated is problematic.

Doctrine and what is taught should be synonymous; this is especially critical in the case of FM 3-24. The doctrine serves as a keystone document at the US Army Command and General Staff College and the Army War College; for brigade and battalion command teams deploying to Iraq; and at the COIN Center for Excellence at Taji, north of Baghdad. This pedagogy is an exemplar of Kitson's model, a methodology of fully supporting the imperative of learn and adapt.[29] These classroom presentations help to explain the

doctrine, its practical application, and clarifies for those returning to Iraq just what has changed. Supporting the learn and adapt imperative is worth examining further, not just in terms of learning from operations per se, but also learning the valuable lessons of history. John Nagl makes this point, as does Steven Metz with both authors advocating a broader view than the here and now.[30]

Relevant and Current

Doctrine must be valid, relevant, and current. If not, it will be ignored. Its principles and general application need to be based on sound historical analysis and judgement. As equally important is the requirement that the doctrine be updated to keep pace with the evolving circumstances or, even better, it should serve the purpose of setting the agenda and how practitioners view the battle; as the AirLand Battle concept did in the 1980s.[31] The danger all doctrine faces is that it can be out of date the moment it is published. Its usefulness therefore comes from the strength and endurance of its principles and the general approach it provides. While FM 3-24 is a marked improvement in its description of adversarial groups, the complex spectrum of adversaries, and the globalized reality of where and how the insurgent and counterinsurgent may act, there is much more that can be done in these areas.[32] The manual needs to "be more explicit about the fact that doctrine is describing a philosophy that is far beyond the classical interpretation of COIN. It needs to present in bold print who the enemies are and what the lack of government capacity really means for forces trying to counter such threats."[33]

The apparent contradictions between the doctrine in the manual and some readers' personal experiences in Iraq and Vietnam may be reflective of one of the key institutional challenges facing the US Army. Doctrine is of no value if it is not seen as relevant or is perceived to have a void between theory and practice. While such perceptions can be addressed through training and education, this may take considerable time, perhaps as long as ten years, if the experiences of Vietnam are any indicator. In the meantime, American forces and the doctrine's authors will have to weather the storm from the critics.

Manageable and Accessible

The practitioner has to be able to read, understand, and inculcate the appropriate amount of material that will not leave him overwhelmed or fixated on minutiae. The doctrine writer therefore should strive to strike a balance between the critical imperatives and verbosity. Too little explanation creates more questions than are answered. Too much information often exceeds the scope of how to think and spills over into what to think, winding up

in the realm of dogma. This is a particular problem when there is a process involved and where trying to apply it dogmatically to the wrong level of command and in the wrong circumstances only creates confusion.

At more than 220 pages, there is an oft-repeated concern about the manual's length and the extent of the information covered. Not everyone will read it cover to cover. The project leader, Conrad Crane, has explained that it was decided from the outset that the first edition had to include information that otherwise might have been omitted in order to establish the scope of the subject matter and to present a baseline of knowledge. General Petraeus's intent was to break new ground. The result being the inclusion of some very specific information that could not be found in other references.[34] Nevertheless, some consideration had to be given to the casual reader who only intermittently delves into doctrine, so sections were designed to be standalone references resulting in more information being included than would otherwise be desirable. In reality, there was a great deal more that might have been included, this relates directly back to the how or what to think debate and the age-old editor's dilemma: At what point does doctrine become too descriptive or too prescriptive?

So is a 220-page book accessible to the readership that required it? FM 3-24 was published on the Internet on 15 December 2006 and was downloaded more than 1.5 million times in the first month. This high level of interest did not address the real issue of how people were to comprehend the material or what specifically they would take away from it. There is merit in discussing the effectiveness of posting a 14-megabyte document on the Web. The University of Chicago Press's decision to publish FM 3-24 is not only unusual in terms of selecting pure doctrine as a topic but a decision to be applauded for opening the horizons of potential readers.

What's the Verdict?

The questions of whether the doctrine is acceptable, teachable, relevant and current, manageable, and accessible are all criteria identified as essential for doctrine to be effective. The principal concern, however, is the question of whether doctrine is succeeding in the field. It is worthy of noting that there is a clear link between the doctrine and the policy underpinning operations in Iraq:[35]

> The recently released military doctrinal manual on counterinsurgency operations declares, "The cornerstone of any [counterinsurgency] effort is establishing security for the civilian populace. Without a secure environment, no permanent reforms can be implemented and disorder spreads." This statement encapsulates the wisdom of generations of counterinsurgent theorists and practitioners. The importance of establishing security is manifold.[36]

There can be little doubt that doctrine has to be assimilated if is to be effective. While the written word is important, the proof is in the circumstances, not the doctrine alone. Doctrine cannot stand alone: It is the sum total of understanding, experience, training, and resources, applied by means of a plan, to a specific set of circumstances. If a soldier's understanding is reasonably complete and is guided by sound doctrine, the likelihood of success is that much stronger.[37] This underlines the importance of the doctrinal approach of "learn and adapt." After all, things change; to include the broader context of an insurgency. In the case of the Coalition campaign in Iraq, the efforts taken to produce counterinsurgency doctrine and to recalibrate the training, education, and preparations for deployment appear to be benefiting. The palpable coherency that exists, underpinned by the clear-hold-build approach, is a clear, vital improvement over the previous disjointed efforts.

The Other 80 Percent

The point was made in the introduction that countering insurgency is anything but a military problem. The military will normally never account for more than 20 percent of the solution at best. At worst it may fall a long way short of that percentage and may even become part of the larger problem. Experience indicates and research supports the contention that if the practitioner's understanding is genuine, guided by sound doctrine, the likelihood of success is much greater.[38]

But what of the majority shareholder? What of the remaining 80 percent? The US State Department draft *21st Century Counterinsurgency: A Guide for U.S. Policymakers* is a start. Again, as identified in the introduction, the rusty machinery of various government agencies needs an overhaul, the establishment of a sound doctrinal underpinning is clearly essential. The publication of FM 3-24 should inspire such efforts. The State Department draft appears to have the constituent parts, but a sense of purpose seems to be missing. One of the clear strengths of FM 3-24 is its identification of the population and the legitimacy of the host nation's government as the primary objectives to secure. These two themes clearly underpin current operations in Iraq. The policymaker's guide needs to be equally clear if it is to unify national efforts in a coalition campaign.

In critiquing FM 3-24 an easy approach would be to declare "this is what doctrine was," and challenge whether the assumptions it makes are still valid. There are arguments for and against the classic counterinsurgency principles, whether they are Galula's, Thompon's, Kitson's, or variations on these doctrinal themes. How to reinterpret these principles is the doctrine writer's dilemma. Whether one supports the radical revisionist school or the more conventional approach of enduring truths, the landscape has changed markedly.

The questions remain, to what extent and for what outcome should doctrine be developed? The answer resounds from any number of sources—from the reality of operations, analysis and apportionment in national capitals, and from think tanks and wargamers. It is inconceivable that in the future doctrine writers can avoid addressing joint, combined, multinational, and interagency dimensions of complex operations. At present, this responsibility remains the uncomfortable arena of army-only writing teams, a fact complicated even further by the need to write for its own target audience. It is self-evident that one part of the 20 percent of the counterinsurgency solution cannot reach across the other 80 percent span of interests to find resolution. The trick is to get an agreed mandate for writing a doctrine that draws upon government departments within the originating nation and between allies and coalition partners.

Conclusion

In his introduction to Kitson's *Low Intensity Operations*, General Sir Michael Carver noted the book was "written for the soldier of today to help him prepare for the operations of tomorrow."[39] FM 3-24 is not general enough to be applicable for every future insurgency. The future proposal for a more expansive effort is something for further discussion. The immediate issue is one of winning the campaigns of today. From an ally's perspective, US counterinsurgency doctrine is based on sound classical theory which, with respect to the British model of counterinsurgency, inverts the focus of the last few years of the twentieth century from emphasis on the insurgent to a greater understanding of the importance of the population: A doctrinal evolution reflecting the dynamics of interventionist counterinsurgency. It certainly is in agreement with the British Army view of what effective doctrine should be, not just because of what it says, but how it clearly translates to effective operations in the field. What more could be asked of doctrine?

On the other hand, the criticisms FM 3-24 drew after its publication have, for the most part, stood up to examination. That some commentaries have been critical is not the issue. What matters is whether the process of assimilating the lessons of FM 3-24, based on recent experiences in Iraq and stretching back some 60 years, meets the needs of the practitioner. If reports from authors like Michael O'Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack are to be believed, the real-life application of the new doctrine is succeeding:

> Here is the most important thing Americans need to understand: We are finally getting somewhere in Iraq, at least in military terms. As two analysts who have harshly criticized the Bush administration's miserable handling of Iraq, we were surprised by the gains we saw and the potential to produce not necessarily "victory" but a sustainable stability that both we and the Iraqis could live with.[40]

At the counterinsurgency doctrine workshop at Fort Leavenworth in February 2006, plenary discussions returned time and again to the important, oft-repeated point that counterinsurgency takes time, people, patience, resolve, and money. For that reason alone, the new doctrine is valuable: There is no basis for any expectation of rapid success in counterinsurgency. Whatever its failings, omissions, oversimplifications, and misunderstandings, FM 3-24 provides the intellectual foundation for success. The manual is beginning to shape the development of counterinsurgency doctrine capable of meeting future challenges. From this ally's point of view, it is presently doing its job. It is serving the military's purpose, but that purpose can only be fully met in the context of the 80 percent political, 20 percent military balance. Addressing the other 80 percent is the next and, perhaps most critical, step.

NOTES

1. Reported in Tony Allen-Mills, "Listen up Maggot, We Can Win This," *The Sunday Times* (London), 5 August 2007. See also Michael E. O'Hanlon and Kenneth M. Pollack, "A War We Just Might Win," *The New York Times*, 30 July 2007, of particular interest given the authors "have harshly criticized the Bush administration's miserable handling of Iraq."

2. John A. Nagl provides a succinct summary of how the doctrine was developed in "The Evolution and Importance of Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency" in *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual by the United States Army and United States Marine Corps* (Chicago, Ill.: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2007), xiii-xx.

3. "'A revolutionary war is 20 percent military action and 80 percent political' is a formula that reflects reality," David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1964, Rpt. 2006), 63.

4. John Mackinlay, *Defeating Complex Insurgency: Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan* (London: RUSI, Whitehall Paper Number 64, 2005); David Kilcullen, "Counterinsurgency *Redux*," *Survival*, 48 (Winter 2006); Steven Metz, *Rethinking Insurgency* (Carlisle, Pa.: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2007).

5. US Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* (Washington: Headquarters Department of the Army, December 2006), 1-1. Hereafter referred to as FM 3-24.

6. Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2005), 30.

7. FM 3-24, 1-1. The British Army defines insurgency as "actions of a minority group within a state who are intent on forcing political change by means of a mixture of subversion propaganda and military pressure aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of people to accept such a change." Army Code 71749 Army Field Manual, Vol. 1 Combined Arms Operations, Part 10 *Counter-Insurgency Operations (Strategic and Operational Guidelines)*, London: Prepared under the direction of the Chief of the General Staff, July 2001, A-3.

8. Galula, 63.

9. Frank Kitson, *Bunch of Five* (London: Faber and Faber, 1977), 283.

10. J. F. C. Fuller, *The Foundations of the Science of War* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1926), 254.

11. John Kiszely, interview with author, 15 February 2007. See John Kiszely, "Learning About Counterinsurgency," *RUSI Journal*, 151 (December 2006), 16-21.

12. See US Department of the Army, *2007 Army Modernization Plan* (Washington: Headquarters Department of the Army, 5 March 2007), 18 and "Doctrine Development," US Army Combined Arms Center, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/doctrine.asp.

13. Nagl, xiv.

14. "This manual is designed to fill a doctrinal gap. It has been 20 years since the Army published a field manual devoted exclusively to counterinsurgency operations. For the Marine Corps it has been 25 years." Foreword to FM 3-24.

15. Michael Howard, "Military Science in the Age of Peace," *RUSI Journal*, 119 (March 1974), 7.

16. Alexander Alderson, "Revising the British Army's Counter-Insurgency Doctrine," *RUSI Journal,* 152 (August 2007), 6-11.

17. For a supportive view, albeit from one involved in its production, see Frank Hoffman, "Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?" *Parameters*, 37 (Summer 2007), 71-87. For an evaluation of the doctrine from a tactical, operational, and strategic perspective see James S. Corum, "Rethinking U.S. Army Counter-Insurgency Doctrine," *Contemporary Security Policy*, 28 (April 2007), 127-42. For a highly critical view, see Ralph Peters, "Progress and Peril, New Counterinsurgency Manual Cheats on the History Exam," *Armed Forces Journal International*, 144 (February 2007) and Edward Luttwak, "Dead End," *Harper's Magazine*, February 2007, 33-42 (the latter is a critique of a draft version).

18. "The primary audience for this manual is leaders and planners at the battalion level and above." FM 3-24, vii.

19. Frank Kitson, "Practical Aspects of Counter Insurgency," Kermit Roosevelt Lecture delivered May 1981.

20. Conrad Crane, "FM 3-24 The New American Approach to Counterinsurgency: Genesis and Content," presentation at the Exercise Unified Quest, Defeating an Insurgency Seminar Wargame, McLean, Va., 20 February 2007.

21. FM 3-24, 5-18 – 5-23.

22. Frederick W. Kagan, "Misunderstanding the Surge," *The Weekly Standard,* 5 June 2007; David Kilcullen, "Understanding Current Operations in Iraq," http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/06/understanding-current-operatio/.

23. Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 111-14. Assuming that the government has a plan at the tactical level, Thompson describes an approach where intelligence-led operations act to clear insurgents from an area, control is imposed over the cleared area to protect the population and isolate the insurgent, good government in all its aspects introduced to win, and the area is declared won at the point when control measures can be lifted.

24. David Galula, *Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958* (Rpt.; Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2006) and *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*.

25. David H. Petraeus, Commanding General Multi-National Force-Iraq, interview with author, 14 June 2007.

26. Author's note, Fort Leavenworth, 24 February 2006: "Recognition that context is important, particularly when reviewing doctrine and there is a natural tension between principles and the high emotion stemming from recent operational experience." John Nagl describes the conference in his preface to the Univ. of Chicago Press edition of FM 3-24.

27. Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-keeping* (London: Faber, 1971); *Bunch of Five*.

28. Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations*, 165-67.

29. FM 3-24, 1-26.

30. John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam,* (2d ed.; Chicago, Ill.: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2005) and Metz.

31. For an explanation of the development of AirLand Battle doctrine see Huba Wass de Czege, *Making the Army's Doctrine "Right Enough" Today* (Arlington, Va.: Association of the US Army, Institute of Land Warfare Landpower Essay No. 06-2, September 2006).

32. Ralph Peters was particularly strong in his criticism of a draft of FM 3-24 because it failed to recognize religious zealots in its description of adversary groups. See "Politically Correct War," *The New York Times*, 18 October 2006.

33. Petraeus, interview with author, 14 June 2007.

34. Crane.

35. Frederick W. Kagan, "A Plan for Victory in Iraq: Defeat the Insurgents Militarily—Here's How," *The Weekly Standard*, 22 May 2006. For Kagan's account of the development of the American strategy in Iraq in 2006, based on clear-hold-build, see "Interviews; Frederick Kagan," *Frontline*, 7 February 2007, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/endgame/interviews/kagan.html#3.

36. Iraq Planning Group, *Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq Phase I Report* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 5 January 2007), 5.

37. Senior British officer, telephone interview with author, Baghdad, 2 August 2007.

38. A. D. Hossack, *Research Paper II: Terrorist/Insurgent Success Factors* (Farnborough, U.K.: Defence Science & Technology Laboratory, September 2006).

39. Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations*, xi.

40. O'Hanlon and Pollack.